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I. INTRODUCTION
Law firms and other professional organizations (e.g.,
accounting firms, medical practice groups) had until recently
remained somewhat immune to the economic cycles affecting the
rest of the U.S. economy.' It was extremely uncommon to hear
about downsizing, mergers, and layoffs in any of these
organizations.2 Law firms and their counterparts in other
professions appeared to have been fairly isolated somehow from
the ebbs and flows of the economy.'
That pleasant isolation has dissipated. Starting in the early
1990s 4 and certainly in the first couple of years of the new
millennium, the harsh realities of the business cycle have
touched even these organizations.' Closing of operations,6
mergers,7 and downsizing8 have become common occurrences
among professional organizations.9 More broadly, concerns about
cost-cutting measures have become a common part of the
operations of many professional organizations.'o
One of the effects of the "industrialization" of professional
1. See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS 20-36 (1991)
(describing the "Golden Age" of law practice).
2. See Marc S. Galanter & Thomas M. Palay, Large Law Firm Misery: It's the
Tournament, Not the Money, 52 VAND. L. REV. 953, 965-66 (1999) (discussing the changes
experienced by law firms in business and employment practices in the preceding decade).
3. See Elizabeth H. Gorman, Moving Away from "Up or Out": Determinants of
Permanent Employment in Law Firms, 33 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 637, 637-42 (describing the
environment in which law firms operated for much of the last century).
4. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 1, at 37-76 (noting that by the early 1990s
promotion practices of the "big firm" had changed, with significantly fewer associates
achieving partnerships, and those who achieve partnership facing pressure and risk once
partnership is attained).
5. See David Hechler, Slowing the Pace, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 18, 2002, at Al
(describing the general slowdown on law firms' business over the last couple of years),
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jspid=1036630438700.
6. See Peter D. Zeughauser, Your Future Is at Stake, AM. LAW., May 2003, at 49
(discussing the collapse and closing of the once-stable Brobeck, Phleger, and Harrison law
firm in January of 2003).
7. See Neil Caesar, The Age of Mergers Is Here: Decide Now How to Decide,
Managed Care, Legal Forum, at http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/9701
9701.legal.shtml (Jan. 1997) (describing the recent experience with mergers in the health
care industry); Hechler, supra note 5 (pointing out that the growth of eight of the ten
fastest-growing firms was by means of mergers and acquisitions).
8. See Hechler, supra note 5 (describing recent layoffs experienced at major law
firms).
9. See Galanter & Palay, supra note 2, at 965-66 (noting several law firm
strategies for maintaining profitable growth).
10. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human
Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split
Profits, 37 STAN. L. REv. 313, 317 (1985) (declaring "[sitable organizational life within
many firms seems to be a nostalgic memory of simpler times").
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organizations has been a shift in the business forms that these
organizations adopt.11 Some organizations have shifted from
partnership associations into professional corporations.12 Other
organizations have remained partnerships in form, but have
significantly restructured the roles of partners.13
These changes have exposed a group of individuals who
traditionally have been somewhat isolated from the possibility of
discriminatory practices to the realities faced by millions of other
workers.14 Professional firm partners who have been stripped of
the authority and power they once enjoyed find themselves in
quite vulnerable positions where they do not have the ability to
protect themselves against discriminatory and strategic behavior
by their employers." To add insult to injury, these individuals
may also lack any remedy for the discriminatory treatment they
suffer."8
It is this predicament that Judge Richard A. Posner
addresses in the recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit in EEOC v. Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood. 7
The case involved an age discrimination complaint against the
Chicago-based law firm for the demotion of thirty-two partners
11. See Kristin Nicole Johnson, Note, Resolving the Title VII Partner-Employee
Debate, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1067, 1076 (2003) (describing the modem legal services market
as an "industry" in which firms may take advantage of state law permitting "firms to
select from a variety of business forms").
12. See Susan Saab Fortney, Am I My Partner's Keeper? Peer Review in Law Firms,
66 U. CoLO. L. REV. 329, 340-44 (1995) (discussing the various partnership forms in law
firm practice); Johnson, supra note 11, at 1077-80 (describing recent developments in the
business models used by law firms).
13. See David B. Wilkins, Partners Without Power? A Preliminary Look at Black
Partners in Corporate Law Firms, 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 15 (1999) (noting
that in the contemporary economic environment "partnership is no longer the equivalent
of tenure"); see also GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 1, at 121-38 (describing various
employment arrangements recently implemented by law firms); Gorman, supra note 3, at
637-38 (describing the increasing use of permanent nonpartners employment
arrangements in large law firms).
14. See, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 13, at 16 ("[R]etention now is almost as important
an issue for partners as it is for associates. This is particularly true.., for minority
partners who have recently been exiting their prestigious partnerships at alarming
rates.").
15. See Johnson, supra note 11, at 1069 (observing that "[d]iscrimination against
partners in law firms presents a unique legal issue... [because] the circuits are split on
the issue of whether Title VII covers partners alleging to be victims of discrimination").
16. Id. at 1070. The author explained the following:
[P]laintiffs seeking protection under Title VII must fall within the purview of
the statute. Title VII covers "employers" and "employees." Courts... decline to
exercise jurisdiction if the party alleging discrimination does not qualify as
employee or the party accused of discriminating is not an employer as defined by
the statute.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
17. 315 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2002).
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and for the reduction of the firm's mandatory retirement age as
part of a firm restructuring.'8 The law firm argued that the
investigation should have been halted because the partners
involved in the demotion were not "employees," and thus were
not covered under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA). 9
Similar disputes involving the definition of the term
"employee" under various antidiscrimination statutes have been
percolating through the federal judiciary, even recently reaching
the U.S. Supreme Court.2" In a number of recent cases involving
medical practices,2 accounting firms,22 and law firms,23 courts
have been faced with the task of figuring out the proper contours
of the term "employee" under these statutes. 4 Courts have
proven to be very divided on this issue, both in terms of outcome
and in terms of the doctrinal analysis they have used in deciding
these cases.
As Judge Posner's opinion in the Sidley case suggests,
however, this recent debate has taken place without any direct
discussion by reviewing courts about underlying changes
occurring in employment relationships in these organizations. 8
In this Article, we advance a theoretical framework that we
submit provides some theoretical guidance with respect to the
resolution of the issues raised in cases like Sidley and the matter
currently before the U.S. Supreme Court.
In the next Part of the Article, we briefly summarize Judge
Posner's opinion in the Sidley case. In his characteristic
"academic" style, Judge Posner provides significant insights into
the dynamics surrounding this type of case.26 In Part III, we
18. Id. at 698-99.
19. Id. at 699.
20. See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 123 S. Ct. 1673 (2003);
Schmidt v. Ottawa Med. Ctr., P.C., 322 F.3d 461 (7th Cir. 2003).
21. Schmidt, 322 F.3d at 462; Strother v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d
859 (9th Cir. 1996).
22. Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996); Fountain v. Metcalf,
Zima & Co., P.A., 925 F.2d 1398 (11th Cir. 1991).
23. Sidley, 315 F.3d at 698.
24. Id. at 702.
25. Id. at 701. Judge Posner first notes that it was "remarkable" that "neither party
has addressed the question why some or all members of partnerships should for purposes
of the federal antidiscrimination laws be deemed employers and so placed outside the
protection of these laws." Id. After discussing a number of cases from a variety of related
areas, Judge Posner concludes, "[alll that is clear amidst this welter of cases is that the
coverage issue in the present case remains murky despite Sidley's partial compliance with
the subpoena." Id. at 707.
26. Refer to Part II infra.
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discuss the theory of Internal Labor Markets (ILMs).'7 Over the
past decade, various scholars have utilized ILMs theory to
address a number of difficult employment law issues. Relying on
the recent work of Professor Christine Jolls and others, we argue
that ILMs theory provides helpful insights into the discussion at
hand. In Part IV, we discuss the implications of ILMs theory for
the Sidley case and related important cases. 8 Part V of the
Article concludes our work.'
II. EEOC v. SIDLEY, AUSTIN, BROWN & WOOD
A. Majority Opinion
In 1999 the law firm of Sidley & Austin (S&A) demoted
thirty-two of its equity partners to the rank of "counsel" or
"senior counsel."" The EEOC then began an investigation to
determine whether these partner demotions might have violated
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).3' As part of
its investigation, the EEOC sought considerable information
from S&A. 2 S&A contended it provided enough information to
prove that the demoted equity partners were "real partners" and
thus "employers" under federal antidiscrimination law.' Because
federal antidiscrimination laws apply only to "employees" and
not "employers," S&A asserted that the EEOC had no jurisdiction
over the case."'
The EEOC disagreed and sought a federal district court
order enforcing its subpoena against S&A for more information.35
The district court ordered the law firm to "comply in full," and
S&A immediately appealed this decision to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit." A three judge panel comprised
27. Refer to Part III infra.
28. Refer to Part IV infra.
29. Refer to note 246 infra and accompanying text.
30. Sidley, 315 F.3d at 698.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 698-99.
34. Id. at 699. Sidley & Austin's argument was that
the Commission has no jurisdiction.., because a partner is an employer within
the meaning of the federal antidiscrimination laws if (a) his income included a
share of the firm's profits, (b) he made a contribution to the capital of the firm,
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of Judges Richard Posner, Frank Easterbrook, and Diane Wood-
interestingly, all former University of Chicago Law School
Professors-heard the case and issued an opinion on October 24,
2002. 37
The court's opinion, authored by Judge Posner, enforced the
district court's ruling in part and remanded the case back to the
lower court with directions.38 Judge Posner ruled that there was
enough "doubt" regarding whether the thirty-two demoted
partners were truly "employers" under federal antidiscrimination
law to entitle the EEOC to full compliance with the "coverage
portion of the subpoena"-the part of the subpoena requesting
documents relating to whether the thirty-two former partners
are covered as "employees" under the ADEA."9 The Seventh
Circuit further ordered the federal district court to evaluate all of
these documents once submitted and make a determination
regarding whether or not the thirty-two demoted partners were
covered by federal antidiscrimination law.4' The appeals court
held that S&A's compliance with the part of the EEOC's
subpoena calling for "voluminous and sensitive documentation"
relating to the merits of whether the former partners had been
subjected to age discrimination would only be triggered by an
initial district court determination that said employees were
"employees" for ADEA purposes.4'
Before getting to this "bottom line," however, Judge Posner
engaged in a highly illuminating discussion of how large law
firms-and indeed other professional services firms-really work.
Judge Posner took pains to point out that S&A "complied with all
the formalities required by Illinois law to establish and maintain
a partnership," and that the thirty-two aggrieved individuals
were clearly "partners" within the "meaning of applicable
partnership law." The key question to Judge Posner, though,
was whether "when a firm employs the latitude allowed to it by
state law to reconfigure a partnership in the direction of making
it a de facto corporation, a federal agency enforcing
antidiscrimination law is compelled to treat all 'partners' as
employers.""
In developing his argument, Judge Posner cited to the U.S.
37. Id. at 696, 698.




42. Id. at 701-02.
43. Id. at 705.
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Supreme Court case of Hishon v. King & Spalding," which held
that law firm decisions regarding whether to promote lawyers to
firm partnerships are subject to federal antidiscrimination law.45
In his important concurring opinion in that case, Justice Lewis
Powell noted that the relationship among law partners
traditionally differs markedly from that of employer and
employee in that the "essence of the law [ofi partnership is the
common conduct of a shared enterprise."4" Moreover, Justice
Powell wrote that the "relationship among law partners
contemplates that decisions important to the partnership
normally will be made by common agreement or consent among
the partners.""
Judge Posner observed that in contrast to Justice Powell's
"traditional law partnership," S&A operated in a much more
hierarchical "corporate" manner.49 All power in the firm
essentially resided, and continues to reside, in a thirty-six
member executive committee.50 The partnership at S&A does not
elect the executive committee. Instead, the executive committee
elects its own members "like the self-perpetuating board of
trustees of a private university or other charitable foundation." '
While partners at S&A do have some limited powers, "so far as
their own status is concerned they are at the [executive]
committee's mercy." 3 The firm's executive committee can fire
partners, demote partners (as it did with the thirty-two
aggrieved parties), raise or lower their pay, and so forth. 4
Virtually all important decisions of the firm are made by the
executive committee, with partnership-wide votes on matters
occurring roughly once every twenty-five years."
The most "partneresque feature" of the thirty-two partners'
relation to the firm, Judge Posner conceded, was their "personal
liability for the firm's debts." 6 Judge Posner, though, citing and
44. 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
45. Id. at 77-78 (declaring that "nothing in the statute or legislative
history... would support such a per se exemption" of partnership decisions from Title VII
coverage).
46. Id. at 79-80 (Powell, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 80 (Powell, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
48. Sidley, 315 F.3d at 706.
49. Id. at 702-03.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 703.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 699.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 703.
20031 975
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discussing a "broadly similar" case involving the large accounting
firm partnership of Ernst & Young, 7 questioned whether this
was enough to pin the proverbial "tail on the donkey."58 He noted
that, if "implicit in the ADEA's exemption for employers is
recognition that partners ordinarily have adequate remedies
under partnership law to protect themselves against oppression
(including age or other forms of invidious discrimination)," the
issue of partner "exposure to liability can hardly be decisive."59
Judge Posner averred that the thirty-two demoted partners were
"defenseless" and "had no power over their fate."0 He also
pointed out that if other partners "shirked" and as a result
imposed liability on the thirty-two, these thirty-two partners
could not, unlike partners in a "conventional partnership," vote
to expel them because they had no real "voting power."
In sum, Judge Posner cautioned against the "tyranny of
labels," making clear that being titled a major law firm equity
"partner" does not necessarily mean the individual is an
"employer" for federal antidiscrimination law purposes."2 He left
it up to the district court, however, to ultimately make this
determination with respect to the thirty-two demoted equity
partners at S&A.'
B. Judge Easterbrook's Concurrence
Judge Frank Easterbrook concurred in part with the court's
decision and concurred in its judgment. Somewhat ironically,
though, given the context of the case, such "concurring" labels
can be fairly deceiving, given that he fundamentally disagreed
with the court's decision. Judge Easterbrook sharply questioned
why the court decided to "punt" the critical legal question in the
case to the district court.64 He asserted that "Sidley and other
large partnerships need to plan their affairs," and that the
members of these firms "need to know their legal status."
In Judge Easterbrook's reading of the law, the thirty-two
demoted equity partners at S&A were "bona fide ... real
57. See Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996).
58. Sidley, 315 F.3d at 703.
59. Id. at 704.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 705-06.
63. Id. at 707.
64. Id. at 708 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
65. Id. (Easterbrook, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
976 [40:4
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partners and consequently not employees."66 These thirty-two
individuals were not "income" partners of the firm; they shared
firm profits and were liable for firm losses, and Judge
Easterbrook chastised his colleagues for not pointing to any clear
authority for the proposition that "concentration of decision-
making authority within an entity alters the legal status of those
who share profits and bear all residual risk of loss." 7
Moreover, Judge Easterbrook questioned whether a
concentration of decision-making power at S&A truly left all of
the firm's 450-plus nonexecutive committee member partners
powerless." He noted that in universities and other organizations
the fact that a "board of trustees holds all the legal authority"
does not mean that committees throughout the organization lack
"real influence and responsibility."" Consequently, he asserted
that his colleagues "ought not to sneeze at Sidley's observation"
that all thirty-two of the demoted partners served on various and
sundry law firm committees.0 In short, Judge Easterbrook had
no real question about S&A's assertion that the thirty-two
demoted equity partners were legally "employers" and thus not
covered by the protections of the ADEA.71
The reason for the nature of his concurring opinion, though,
was the fact that he had some "uncertainty" regarding whether
all partners at S&A are "employers" for age discrimination law
purposes.72 More specifically, Judge Easterbrook noted that S&A
has a mandatory "retirement age for everyone it dubs a partner"
and that there might be possible ADEA violations if some other
partners at the firm are indeed subject to ADEA coverage.73 In
this context, Judge Easterbrook concurred in the court's decision
to permit the EEOC to gather further information regarding
possible partnership "coverage" under the ADEA at S&A.4
66. Id. at 709 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
67. Id. at 709-10 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
68. Id. at 710 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
69. Id. (Easterbrook, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
70. Id. (Easterbrook, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
71. Id. at 711 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
72. Id. (Easterbrook, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
73. Id. at 710-12 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
74. Id. at 711-12 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
2003] 977
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III. INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND THE MARKET FOR LAWYERS
The employment relationship can take a variety of forms. 9
Employers and employees can enter discrete contracts of fairly
short duration and with no expectation of continuing
employment." These types of arrangements have been described
as encompassing what economists call the Externai Labor
Market (ELM).7 ELMs are characterized by large numbers of
workers and large numbers of employers." In general, ELMs are
considered relatively competitive due to the mobility of workers
and the competition among firms for these new workers.9
ELMs operate on two basic assumptions. First, the tasks
performed by employees are of a general kind in the sense that
very little of the task is specific to the particular organization."0
"General skills" are learned by the employee at his or her
expense and thus require no training from the particular firm.81
"General skills" are equally valuable to any other firm in the
search for the same type of knowledge. 2 Second, within the ELM
context there is no expectation of a long-term employment
relationship. Both parties to employment contracts within the
ELM can terminate the contractual relationship without
incurring any substantial loss. 4
Not all employment transactions, however, are of this form.
Some jobs require the learning of skills that are somewhat
specific to the particular contracting firm.85 These "specific skills"
75. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 57-81 (1975).
76. Id.
77. See Michael L. Wachter, Labor Law Reform: One Step Forward and Two Steps
Back, 34 INDUS. REL. 382, 385 (1995) [hereinafter Wachter, Reform]; see also Michael L.
Wachter & George M. Cohen, The Law and Economics of Collective Bargaining: An
Introduction and Application to the Problems of Subcontracting, Partial Closure, and
Relocation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1353 (1988) [hereinafter Wachter & Cohen, Collective
Bargaining].
78. Wachter & Cohen, Collective Bargaining, supra note 77, at 1357.
79. Id. This "ideal" view of the ELM is realized only under a very detailed specific
set of assumptions (e.g., perfect information, workers' mobility, profit maximization). See
DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW: PROCESS AND POLICY 25-28
(3d ed. 1992). Where these conditions are not met market distortions can arise. Id.
80. See Wachter & Cohen, Collective Bargaining, supra note 77, at 1358-64
(distinguishing between "firm-specific skills" that are not easily transferable to other




83. See Wachter, Reform, supra note 77, at 385.
84. Id.
85. See Douglas L. Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L. REV. 353, 366-67
978 [40:4
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are valuable only to the particular firm; thus, there are no
incentives to acquire them within the ELM context. 6 Employees
will be reluctant to invest in skills that are only valuable to a
particular employer in the absence of some expectation of a long-
term employment relationship. 7 Employers will be equally
reluctant to train employees in these more specific skills, because
there is no guarantee that these employees will either stay with
the firm or perform in a way that allows the employer to recover
the costs associated with such training.8 Thus, the need arises to
devise a mechanism that will create the right kind of incentives
for the acquisition of firm-specific skills. 9
Internal Labor Markets provide such a mechanism and
constitute an alternative to exclusive reliance on the use of
ELMs.0 "ILMs arise because of ELMs' inability to deal with
employment transactions when there is a need for skills that are
specific to a firm."9 Implementation of an ILM requires the
employer and employee to 'agree to an understanding of a long-
term employment relationship."
"By internalizing parts of the employment relationship,
firms potentially can encourage workers to make long-term
investments with them, which in turn produce technological and
cost efficiencies for the firm.""5 Such "internalizing" involves
undertaking certain types of investments in human capital.94
Employees make firm-specific investments early in their careers
by learning skills required to perform firm jobs and agreeing to a
wage rate lower than what they could potentially get elsewhere-
(1984) (describing the relationship between ILMs and firm-specific job skills).
86. See Wachter & Cohen, Collective Bargaining, supra note 77, at 1358.
87. See id. at 1363 (observing that employees are willing to accept lower wages
while they are learning firm-specific skills because they expect to receive higher wages
later in their careers); see also Ramona L. Paetzold & Rafael Gely, Through the Looking
Glass: Can Title VII Help Women and Minorities Shatter the Glass Ceiling?, 31 HOUS. L.
REV. 1517, 1522-23 (1995) (discussing the reluctance of an employee to leave her job until
she has recovered her investment in firm-specific skills).
88. Paetzold & Gely, supra note 87, at 1522-23; see also Wachter & Cohen,
Collective Bargaining, supra note 77, at 1364 (illustrating an employee's ability to behave
strategically by shirking or threatening to quit).
89. See Paetzold & Gely, supra note 87, at 1522-24 (discussing the development of
ILMs and their application to employment discrimination problems).
90. See Wachter & Cohen, Collective Bargaining, supra note 77, at 1358 (asserting
that ILMs arise because of the costs of job- or company-specific skills); see also Wachter,
Reform, supra note 77, at 385-86 (contrasting ILMs and ELMs).
91. Paetzold & Gely, supra note 87, at 1522.
92. Id. at 1522-23.
93. See id. at 1522 (citing Wachter & Cohen, Collective Bargaining, supra note 77,
at 1360-61).
94. See Wachter, Reform, supra note 77, at 385.
2003] 979
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the employee's opportunity wage. 95 Employees then recover their
return on this investment at a later point in their careers when
their actual or inside wages are higher than their opportunity or
outside wages.96 Employers, on the other hand, invest at an
earlier stage of the employee's career by paying a wage that is
higher than that employee's marginal productivity.97 The
employer recovers its investment during the employee's mid-
career years." At that stage, the employee's marginal
productivity is believed to exceed the wage paid by the
employer.9
In the ILM, both employers and employees expect that the
employment relationship will be long-term and that they will be
adequately compensated for their investments in the case of a
breach."' For example, once an employee "invests" in learning
firm-specific skills-skills that are not easily transferable to
another firm-she will be disinclined to leave her employer
voluntarily until she has recovered this investment. 1
Conversely, because the employer would lose productivity during
95. See Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and
Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8, 12-19 (1993). Professor Schwab provides an
excellent analysis of the ILM concept from two different perspectives: the "specific human
capital" story and the "efficiency wage" story. Id. at 13-19. Under the "specific human
capital" story, investments in firm-specific skills occur under an incentive system in which
both parties share the cost and benefits associated with learning firm-specific skills
throughout the employee's work life. Id. at 14-15. Professor Schwab points out that a
critical aspect of the "specific human capital story is the self-enforcing" nature of the
employment relationship. Id. at 15. Because the "specific human capital" story assumes at
later stages in the employment relationship that the employee's productivity is higher
than the employee's inside wage, and at the same time that the employee's inside wage is
higher than the employee's opportunity wage, there is no incentive for either party to
terminate the employment relationship. Id. Employees have no incentive to leave the firm
because they are being paid more than they could make in the outside market, and
employers have no incentive to fire the employees because their productivity exceeds their
wages. Id. Under the "efficiency-wage" story, while employees' productivity later in their
careers is higher than their outside or opportunity wage, their inside wage at that stage is
even higher, Id. at 16-17. Consequently, an incentive exists on the part of the employer to
terminate late-career employees because their wages exceed their productivity. Id. at 19.
96. Id. at 18; see also Wachter & Cohen, Collective Bargaining, supra note 77, at
1363 (proposing that employees are willing to take lower wages early in their careers
because they have an expectation that their inside wages will exceed their opportunity
wages later).
97. Wachter & Cohen, Collective Bargaining, supra note 77, at 1361.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1363-64.
100. See Paetzold & Gely, supra note 87, at 1522.
101. Wachter & Cohen, Collective Bargaining, supra note 77, at 1363. Employees
"invest" in learning firm-specific skills by accepting a lower wage than they could get
elsewhere in their career, with the expectation that this investment will pay off by
receiving correspondingly higher wages later in their career. Id.; see also Paetzold & Gely,
supra note 87, at 1522-23 (observing that an employee with firm-specific skills will be
reluctant to leave her employer before recovering her investment).
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the training period for a replacement, the employer has
"invested" in the employee with firm-specific skills and would not
want to lose her to another firm.' ° Thus, to the extent that the
parties to the ILM arrangement continue their relationship, their
agreement will be fully realized 03
Opportunistic or strategic behavior, however, becomes a
problem within ILMs. Opportunistic behavior appears when
either party attempts to breach implicit or explicit contracts.' In
such situations one party can be seen as trying to expropriate the
returns or "rents" that the other party expects out of her
investments. 105 As noted above, workers generally make firm-
specific investments early in their careers and then recoup such
investments as they age."0 6 The employee invests-perhaps by
agreeing to a below-market wage early in her career-with the
expectation that later on she will receive above-market
compensation.!0 7 For example, an employee may, early in her
career, engage in learning a skill that is specific to a particular
employer. While doing this, she will likely agree to receive a
below-market wage with the expectation that later on she will be
permitted to stay in the firm and recover her investment in the
form of above-market compensation. However, if the employer
terminates the employment relationship after the employee has
learned the skill and the employer's investment has been
recovered but before the employee is able to recover her
investment, the employee's investment will be lost.
Similarly, an employer may invest in an employee's career
by paying her more than her marginal productivity at an early or
later stage in her career, with the expectation that the employer
will recover its investment during the employee's mid-career
102. Watchter & Cohen, Collective Bargaining, supra note 57, at 1361; see also
Paetzold & Gely, supra note 87, at 1522 (discussing the employer's potential decreased
productivity due to the loss of employees with firm-specific skills).
103. See Paetzold & Gely, supra note 87, at 1523 ("As long as the expectation of a
long-term employment relationship exists, both parties are likely to perform their
obligations under these implicit agreements."); Wachter, Reform, supra note 77, at 385-86
(discussing how benefits to both an employer and an employee accrue in the ILM); see also
George M. Cohen & Michael L. Wachter, Replacing Striking Workers: The Law and
Economics Approach, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 43RD ANNUAL NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON LABOR 109, 118 (Bruno Stein ed., 1990) (applying the internal labor
model to the issue of strikers' replacements under the NLRA).
104. See Wachter & Cohen, Collective Bargaining, supra note 77, at 1360-64.
105. Id. at 1360.
106. Id. In particular, Wachter & Cohen argue that "workers make sunk investments
in their jobs by agreeing to long-term implicit contracts that provide for 'deferred
compensation,' that is, below-market wages at early stages of employment and above-
market wages at later stages." Id.
107. Id. at 1360-64.
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years. During this middle period, the employee could behave
opportunistically and make it difficult for her employer to recover
its investment."8
For example, let's say a given university has a special
football tradition and a law school dean wants a certain law
faculty member (perhaps a former football player) to serve on a
special university committee meeting two hours per week for the
academic year to study the merits of retaining this tradition.
This service can be viewed as a "firm-specific" investment by the
professor, or alternatively as an investment in the "internal labor
market" of the given university. The roughly sixty hours the
professor spends on this endeavor may win the faculty member
some "good citizen" points at this school, but it will likely be of
roughly zero interest to other universities should the professor
apply to them for a job some time in the future. Indeed, from the
perspective of other universities-the "external labor market"-
the professor would be much better off spending the sixty hours
working on an article for publication in a prestigious law journal.
The dilemma thus becomes clear. The organization wants
the employee to make the firm-specific investment, but the
employee may resist. The faculty member, especially if
untenured, wants to keep his options open; the way to do this is
to develop a general skill set which is readily marketable in the
external labor market. Given this situation, it is far better for the
faculty member to spend sixty hours on a major research
publication than attend meetings for a special university
committee.
For ILMs to work, it is necessary to adopt some mechanisms
to minimize the ability of employers and employees to engage in
opportunistic behavior.109 Arguably, individuals can always enter
contracts to protect against possible opportunistic behavior.110
These contracts can provide guarantees of , long-term
employment, thus allowing the employee sufficient time to
recover the value of her investment in firm-specific skills.' In
theory, contractual arrangements requiring employers to commit
to high pay at the end of the life cycle could "make it possible for
employers and employees to rely on age-based wages."11
108. Id. at 1361.
109. See Christine Jolls, Hands-Tying and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 74 TEx. L. REv. 1813, 1829-30 (1996) (noting that laws may limit age
discrimination).
110. Id. at 1830-35.
111. See id. at 1830 (arguing that contracts might deter employers from firing "older
employees whose wages exceed their marginal revenue product").
112. Id. at 1830-31.
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Several scholars, however, have noted that the contract
option to guard opportunistic behavior is often unsatisfactory."'
Transaction costs, incomplete information, information
processing limitations, and market factors make it difficult for
contracts to be negotiated and adopted in the employment
relationship context."'
In addition to contract mechanisms, other nonlegal
mechanisms exist that can serve to enforce ILM-type contracts,
or for that matter any kind of contract.1 ' First, the party who
feels that the other party is misbehaving can terminate the
relationship."6 In the context of ILMs, employees who feel
employers are trying to violate their understanding regarding
wages can leave their jobs. Obviously, this alternative is useless
to the employee who has made firm-specific investments and is
now seeking to recover those investments."7 Terminating the
employment relationship will, in effect, reward the employer's
misbehavior.
A potentially more powerful sanction relates to the possible
reputational losses that the party in breach will suffer as the
result of repeated violations. 8 Arguably, an employer who
repeatedly violates ILM contracts will develop a reputation for
being "untrustworthy." 9 This reputation will make it harder for
that employer to convince future employees to make the kind of
firm-specific investments the employer expects, creating
difficulties for the employer's operations.20
The extent to which reputation serves as a constraint on
opportunistic behavior is highly questionable, particularly in the
employment context. For example, interfirm transfer of
113. Id. at 1831; see also Schwab, supra note 95, at 21-24 ("To the degree that clear
contracts... are difficult to write, monitor, and enforce, opportunistic behavior by
employees will remain a threat.").
114. See Jolls, supra note 109, at 1831-35.
115. Id. at 1835.
116. Id.; see also Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L.
REV. 947, 958-62 (1984) (arguing that in an at-will employment relationship, one of the
only controls against abuse is each party's ability to opt out of the relationship).
117. See Jolls, supra note 109, at 1835.
118. Id. Professor Jolls distinguishes between losses of future business and
individual or social condemnation. Id. Future business losses refer to the gains that the
party in breach relinquishes from future business interactions with the injured party. Id.
Social condemnation refers to the negative reputation the breaching party acquires within
the relevant business community. Id. Various other scholars have discussed the effect of
reputational losses on curbing opportunistic behavior. See, e.g., Schwab, supra note 95, at
26-27 (contending that one "check" on an employer's opportunistic firing of older workers
is that employer's concern for its reputation).
119. Schwab, supra note 95, at 26-27.
120. See Jolls, supra note 109, at 1835.
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reputational information, such as employees who have been fired
telling new employees about the employer's reputation, is likely
to be incomplete and consequently not likely to serve as a
substantial constraint against opportunistic firings. 12 ' The case
for a reputational constraint is somewhat stronger in the context
of intrafirm reputation transfer-employees in the firm telling
other employees in the same firm about their experiences with
the employer's reputation. Still, reputational constraints are
likely to be minor. Employers possess an extraordinary ability to
misinform employees and reconstruct past events in the light
most favorable to the organization. 2  Employees new to the
organization can be made to believe that they will be better off in
the same situation and that prior problems were not caused by
the employer, but instead by a "disgruntled" group of
employees.
23
Finally, mutual deterrence could be a very effective way of
enforcing some types of contracts-particularly contracts in
which both parties have similar bargaining leverage.2 4
Individuals can retaliate or threaten to retaliate against
contracting partners who attempt to change the terms of the
contract not only by leaving the contractual relationship, which
might not be either a credible or damaging option,2 ' but instead
by staying and fighting under the. existing relationship. 26 In a
sense this is the basis of collective bargaining agreements.1 2' By
121. See Schwab, supra note 95, at 26-27.
122. Clearly the "power" in the relationship lies with the employer, and employees
may be reluctant to question what their employer is telling them. See generally JAMES
ATLESON, VALUE AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1983) (arguing that the
hierarchical nature of the employer/employee relationship has not been equalized through
such devices as unionization and collective bargaining). Moreover, employers may place,
or try to place, restrictions on employee communication about events at the workplace.
See David Yamada, Voices from the Cubicle: Protecting and Encouraging Private
Employee Speech in the Post-Industrial Workplace, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 1, 5-21 (1998) ("T]oday's American workplace is evolving into an institution in
which the expression of an individual employee is severely devalued.").
123. See generally GUILLERMO J. GRENIER, INHUMAN RELATIONS: QUALITY CIRCLES
AND ANTI-UNIONISM IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 116-25 (1988) (describing how a social
psychologist at a plant that was undergoing unionization attempted to manipulate
employees into changing positions they had publicly taken supporting the union).
124. See Epstein, supra note 116, at 963-67 (analyzing how an employment-at-will
contract, which empowers both sides to terminate the relationship at any time,
discourages opportunistic behavior by either party).
125. Refer to notes 121-23 supra and accompanying text (discussing the limited
effectiveness of an employee's attempt to spread negative reputational information).
126. Samuel Estreicher, Collective Bargaining or "Collective Begging"?: Reflections on
Antistrikebreaker Legislation, 93 MICH. L. REV. 577, 580 (1994) ("W]orkers have a right
to ... promote their interests by engaging in strikes and other concerted activities, . ").
127. See id. at 600 n.97 (noting that Congress clearly intended the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935 to "provide a collective employee check on management demands at
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allowing employees to organize collectively, we place employers
and employees on a similar footing, at least in the sense that
they can both make credible threats and commit to those
threats.128 The ability to make and carry out threats such as
strikes and lockouts provides the necessary incentives for both
parties to "stick" to the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement, avoiding other more disruptive enforcing
mechanisms.129
Partnership agreements can be conceptualized in the same
way. Partners, particularly in smaller partnerships, have the
ability to easily monitor each other's behavior. 30 Partners also
can pressure misbehaving partners through the use of other
rights conferred to all partners under partnership agreements.13" '
If, for example, in a two-person partnership all major business
decisions must be made by unanimity, an aggrieved partner can
oppose any decisions until the partner in breach rectifies prior
wrongs.' 2 In larger partnerships, aggrieved partners may be able
to form coalitions with other partners and collectively exercise
their voting rights in a manner that ensures their complaints are
addressed."'
While none of the enforcing mechanisms described are
perfect, there is a role for the law to play.' Various scholars have
demonstrated in several different areas that recognizing and
enforcing ILM contracts can enhance efficiency.'35 Particularly,
the bargaining table").
128. See Stewart J. Schwab, Collective Bargaining and the Coase Theorem, 72
CORNELL L. REv. 245, 255 (1987) (summarizing the arguments of others that unions can
promote efficiency by acting as "countervailing powers against employers' monopsony
power").
129. Id. at 254 ("[Clollective bargaining is intended to prevent fundamental, perhaps
violent, up-heaval in our industrial system. Undoubtably strikes will occur because they
are a necessary element of private collective bargaining." (footnote omitted)).
130. See Epstein, supra note 116, at 960 (commenting that monitoring activities may
include tracking who spends the most time in the office working on firm business and
whose services are demanded by the customers).
131. See Fortney, supra note 12, at 340 (finding that a law firm's cultural and
organizational structure may give partners the right to review their peers).
132. See Epstein, supra note 116, at 962 (noting that in extreme cases one partner
may threaten to withdraw from the partnership).
133. See Wilkins, supra note 13, at 47 (describing allegiances with powerful partners
inside a big law firm as one way minority partners can "break out of the circle of
powerlessness").
134. See Jolls, supra note 109, at 1829 (suggesting that legal rules can help satisfy
an employer and employee's preference for age-based wages when the unregulated
market fails to do so).
135. See, e.g., Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, Striker Replacements: A Law,
Economics, and Negotiations Approach, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 363, 366 (1995) (applying ILM
theory to argue that permitting employers to hire permanent replacements for striking
workers is economically inefficient); Rafael Gely, Whose Team Are You On? My Team or
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the ADEA has been described as a "hands-tying" mechanism.136
By prohibiting dismissals based on age, the ADEA makes it
credible for the employer to commit to an ILM contract in which
wages increase with seniority. 713 This allows ILMs to be created,
motivating employees to make firm-specific investments with
particular employers."
IV. IMPLICATIONS
A. Implications for Sidley & Austin's Litigation
The ILM model provides significant insights into the kind of
legal dispute addressed in the Sidley case. The question of
whether an individual plaintiff is a partner and thus outside the
protection of the ADEA must be understood in the context of the
dynamics that in part motivate partnership agreements and in
the context of the role that partnership agreements play as a
sanction in the enforcement of ILM contracts.
Our argument is that the traditional career progression in
law firms-the promotion-to-partner system-can be understood
as the way for law firms to implement ILM arrangements. Law
practice, particularly in large law firms, involves a significant
amount of firm-specific training. 19 Providing legal advice to
clients requires learning information about clients, and the
relevant environment in which lawyers operate is very specific to
the given client and very valuable to the particular employer. 4 '
This firm-specific information could also be very valuable to
competitor law firms. 4' Thus, we have a kind of knowledge that
My TEAM?: The NLRA's Section 8(a)(2) and the TEAM Act, 49 RUTGERS L. REv. 323, 327
(1997) (analyzing employee participatory programs from an ILM theory perspective);
Schwab, supra note 95, at 11 (using ILM theory to examine "whether courts should
presume... that an employee is at will or protected by just cause").
136. See Jolls, supra note 109, at 1841.
137. Id. at 1846 (concluding that the ADEA is, in part, a device that allows
employers to commit to age-based wages).
138. Id. at 1837-38 (reasoning that legal rules limiting the cost-based discharge of
older workers frees employees to participate in an ILM relationship with an employer
even though the employee may change jobs in the future).
139. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 1, at 93-98 (describing the complex
relationship that develops between partner and associate due to the extensive firm-
specific training). "[T]o assure partners that they will receive the proper return on the
investments they make-whether those investments are in client relationships,
reputation, or the skills they impart to associates-the firm must induce associates not to
grab or leave prematurely." Id. at 99.
140. Id. at 95 (observing that investing in an associate exposes the law firm to the
risk that the associate may develop relationships with the firm's clients that allow the
associate to take them and leave).
141. See id.
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the employer needs to share with the employee requiring some
investment on the part of the employee, but which the employer
also wants to protect from competitors. To motivate employees to
make this kind of investment, the employer needs to provide a
set of incentives that potentially guarantees a long-term
employment relationship."'
The promotion-to-partner arrangement provides the
necessary incentives." The employee is given the opportunity to
prove herself over the course of roughly seven years.'" During
this time the employee is making the firm-specific investments
the employer needs.' The employee makes these investments
with the hopeful expectation of reaching partner status.'4 With
the promotion to partner comes an expectation of long-term
employment.
14 7
Notice that the partnership structure serves as an
enforcement mechanism for the ILM type of contract. Once an
associate becomes a partner, arguably she has rights similar to
those of other partners, and thus a voice in partnership decisions,
access to meetings, and, in short, the ability to enforce the
expectations of the bargain reached with the law firm.'48
The ILM contract in law firms, however, will not be self-
142. See id. at 99 (recognizing the firm's need to design incentives that retain an
associate until the firm fully recovers its investment in the associate).
143. Id. at 100.
144. Id. (noting that the "promotion-to-partner tournament" typically lasts for six to
ten years).
145. Id. Galanter and Palay describe the "tournament" as follows:
For a fixed period of time (six to ten years) the law firm pays a salary to
associates who neither grab nor leave. At each successive stage in the hierarchy,
part of the associate's salary increase includes a deferred bonus for
nonopportunistic behavior in the earlier years. In addition, during this period
the firm implicitly tells its associates that it constantly evaluates them for a
"superbonus," consisting of promotion to partner. In effect the firm holds a
tournament in which all the associates in a particular "entering class" compete




147. Galanter and Palay further state:
The tournament provides the assurances and incentives required by both the
associates and the partners. Associates now have an incentive to produce the
maximum combination of legal work and human capital .... By declaring in
advance that, on average, it will promote a fixed percentage of the associates
after a period of time, the firm has obligated itself to distribute a fixed amount of
compensation to the winners of the tournament.
Id. at 101.
148. See EEOC v. Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 702 (7th Cir. 2002)
(observing that partnership law gives partners "effective remedies against oppression by
their fellow partners").
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enforcing if, as in the S&A situation, partners do not all enjoy
roughly similar rights.149 If the promotion to partner does not
carry with it at least some ability to influence decisions and have
access to forming alliances, there will be nothing in the
employment relationship that will prevent employers from
reneging on their agreements with associates.'
When employers renege on their ILM contracts, employees
may have access to a myriad of statutory protections that could
protect their investments in firm-specific skills.'51 In particular,
as Professor Jolls has noted, the ADEA can be conceptualized as
a hands-tying mechanism allowing employers to commit to a
long-term, age-based wage strategy."2 The problem for law firm
partners is, as was argued by S&A, that they might not be
"employees" under the various antidiscrimination statutes.5 3
Thus, they may not have available to them the statutory
protections available to "employees" under the various
antidiscrimination laws. At the same time, because of the
manner in which their employers have structured the
partnership relationship, they do not have the same mechanisms
to enforce the understandings reached under the ILM
arrangement as individuals in "traditional partnerships.
Under these conditions, law firms have the opportunity to
behave strategically. By promoting an associate to partner, the
law firm removes the particular individual from the coverage of
statutory protections like the ADEA, which could serve to
ameliorate the ability of employers to cheat on their ILM
agreements. 56 By structuring the partnership relationship in a
149. See Wilkins, supra note 13, at 16 (discussing how a law firm partnership
agreement that does not provide partners with similar rights creates a group of partners
that are substantially weaker than the elite partners that manage the firm).
150. See Sidley, 315 F.3d at 699 (outlining how S&A's partnership structure placed
the majority of its partners at the mercy of the firm's executive committee).
151. See id. at 708 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (listing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with
Disabilities Act, and the Family and Medical Leave Act as statutes that protect
"employees").
152. Refer to notes 134-38 supra and accompanying text (explaining how ADEA
lends credibility to the employer's commitment to the employee, which encourages the
employee to reciprocate).
153. Sidley, 315 F.3d at 699.
154. Id. ("It is the law that the EEOC cannot protect employers .....
155. Id. at 702-03 (analyzing how Sidley's partnership structure turned most of its
partners into the functional equivalent of employee shareholders).
156. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79-80 (1984) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (clarifying that Title VII does not extend to the relationship between partners
when important decisions are made by common agreement or consent). Of course, we do
not mean to imply that the only reason a law firm promotes an associate to partner is to
limit the ability of that individual to use the protections of the various antidiscrimination
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way that minimizes the ability of the partner to take self-
remedial action within the partnership, the employer takes away
the remaining enforcing mechanism, leaving the individual
vulnerable to the law firm's opportunistic actions. 57
This appears to have been S&A's strategy. Generally, as
both Judge Posner and the late Justice Powell have noted, the
"essence of the law partnership is the common conduct of a
shared enterprise," and "[tihe relationship among law partners
contemplates that decisions important to. 'the partnership
normally will be made by common agreement or consent among
the partners."'58 Contrary to that situation, however, Judge
Posner noted that little of the traditional law partnership model
was left within S&A's hierarchical "corporate" model. 59 He noted
the existence of the self-perpetuating thirty-six member
executive committee and the power wielded by this committee.60
Particularly, Judge Posner noted the executive committee's
unfettered discretion regarding firing, demotions, and
compensation of other partners, and the sparing use of
partnership-wide votes, which Posner noted had occurred once in
the past twenty-five years. 6' According to Judge Posner, this
state of affairs at S&A left the plaintiff partners "defenseless"
with "no power over their fate." ' The plaintiffs did not have any
means to respond to decisions with which they disagreed,
because they had no real "voting power." "
Judge Posner's discussion is entirely consistent with the
ILM model. When hiring an associate, a law firm expects the
individual to make the type of firm-specific investments
necessary in law practice.'64 Associates make these investments
with the expectation that should they successfully jump through
all the "hoops" and become a firm partner they are, if not
guaranteed, at least implicitly provided some measure of job and
laws.
157. See, e.g., Sidley, 315 F.3d at 699 (finding that an executive committee of
partners had the power to fire, demote, or lower the pay of other partners).
158. Id. at 706 (quoting Hishon, 467 U.S. at 79-80 (Powell, J., concurring)).
159. Id. at 705 (describing S&A's as a firm that "employ[ed] the latitude allowed to it
by state law to reconfigure a partnership in the direction of making it a de facto
corporation").
160. Id. at 702-03.
161. Id. at 699.
162. Id. at 704.
163. Id.
164. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 1, at 97 (identifying the location of new clients
for the firm and learning a firm client's business as investments typically made by an
associate).
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income security. 5 The security is channeled in the form of the
partnership.' This ILM type of contract is self-enforcing in the
sense that as a partner each individual has a similar opportunity
to protect herself against possible abuses by other partners.
6 7
Under this model, general parity in the treatment of partners'
rights in law firms is essential to the enforcement of the implicit
ILM understandings!"
The existence of this general parity likely was at least in
part a consideration in Congress's treatment of partners under
the various antidiscrimination statutes. 169 According to Judge
Posner, it appears reasonable that "implicit in the ADEA's
exemption for employers is recognition that partners ordinarily
have adequate remedies under partnership law to protect
themselves against oppression.., by the partnership."7 ' If so,
failure by courts to treat individuals in the position of the
plaintiffs in this type of case as "protected" would leave them
with no remedy to enforce their ILMs contracts, and thus at the
mercy of the law firm, or more specifically the powerful executive
committee. 7' In short, the demoted partners will both not be
covered by the ADEA and not have any of the powers normally
accruing to partners in a "traditional law partnership."7 '
Our discussion of the ILM model also suggests what the
proper legal response should be. If the problem is with the failure
of the self-enforcing aspects of the promotion-to-partner model,
the law can play a constructive role by finding alternative means
to enforce the ILM contract.'73 The ADEA in particular provides
165. Id. at 96 (explaining that part of an associate's compensation involves the
potential opportunity to own a portion of the partnership).
166. Id. at 101 (describing how the prize of admittance to the partnership, which
goes to the winners of the promotion-to-partner tournament, provides the assurances and
incentives required by the associates).
167. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 476 U.S. 69, 79-80 (1984) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (noting that, unlike the partner-associate relationship, the relationship
between law partners is one of equals and that decisions are made by common
agreement).
168. Refer to notes 143-48 supra and accompanying text (discussing how a law firm's
promotion-to-partner arrangement creates ILM understandings and how, once partner
status is attained, it serves to enforce them).
169. See Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867, 869 (7th Cir. 1977) (concluding that
partners in a small partnership were not employees because the common law in existence
prior to the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 recognized that partners
are co-owners who "manage and control the business and share in the profits and losses").
170. EEOC v. Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 704 (7th Cir. 2002)
171. See id. at 699 (detailing the plight of the nonexecutive committee partners
absent a legal remedy under ADEA).
172. See Hishon, 467 U.S. at 79-80 (Powell, J., concurring).
173. See Jolls, supra note 109, at 1837-38 (illustrating how legal rules can help to
ensure the employee will receive the age-based wages that typically result in ILM
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such a mechanism by limiting the ability of employers to make
employment decisions based on age, thus making it possible to
commit to an age-based wage system.'74
Providing individuals who are found in the predicament
faced by the plaintiffs in the S&A case with access to the ADEA
is necessary in order to effectuate the implicit understandings
embedded in the ILM contract.' The ultimate legal issue, as
noted by Judge Posner, is
whether this large law firm-which in recognition that
conventional partnership is designed for much smaller and
simpler firms has contractually altered the structure of the
firm in the direction of the corporate form-should for
purposes of antidiscrimination law be deemed the employer
of some at least of the individuals whom it designates as
partners.
176
In addressing this critical issue, ILM theory suggests that
courts should adopt a very narrow interpretation of the definition
of who is a partner under the various antidiscrimination laws.
Only where the partner label carries with it real authority that
allows the named partner to take effective action against others
in the firm should the court find the individual to be an
"employer," and thus outside statutory coverage.177 This is
because only in these situations can named partners enforce ILM
contracts via nonstatutory means and thus avoid strategic
behavior by the firm.
171
Two tests have been considered by the courts in the various
cases dealing with this issue: the literal or mechanical test, and
the right of control or common law approach.'79 The literal or
mechanical test approach, as the name implies, looks at the
arrangements by complementing or replacing contractual relationships).
174. Refer to notes 134-38 supra and accompanying text (explaining how the ADEA
ties the hands of the employer, preventing it from opportunistically dismissing its senior
employees before they receive the full benefit of the age-based wage system).
175. Refer to notes 92-99 supra and accompanying text (summarizing an employee's
firm-specific investment, expectation for return on that investment, and need for
assurance of adequate compensation if the ILM contract is breached).
176. Sidley, 315 F.3d at 707.
177. See Hishon, 467 U.S. at 79-80 (Powell, J., concurring) (relying on the normal
partnership requirement that partners participate in all important decisions to conclude
that the "reasoning of the Court's opinion does not require that the relationship among
partners be characterized as an 'employment' relationship to which Title VII would
apply").
178. See Jolls, supra note 109, at 1830-31 (explaining how legally enforceable
contractual relationships, such as partnership arrangements, can be used to protect the
parties from opportunistic behavior).
179. Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 442-43 (6th Cir. 1996) (discussing the
development of both tests).
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business form the employer has adopted.180 The choice of
corporate form is determinative to the extent that it "precludes
any examination designed to determine whether the entity" is
anything other than what its corporate form indicates.' Once
this determination is made, the classification of individuals as
employees is mechanical because in a professional corporation all
individuals employed by the corporation qualify as employees
under the various antidiscrimination statutes.182
On. the other hand, the "economic realities" or "right of
control" test disregards form and focuses on substance.83 While
several definitions of this test have been advanced by various
agencies and courts, the basic import of this test involves a
consideration of "the actual role played by the claimant in the
operations of the involved entity and the extent to which that
role dealt with traditional concepts of management, control, and
ownership."84 Courts applying the "economic realities" test have
looked at. factors such as the method of compensation, the
claimant's responsibility for the organization's liability, the
management structure of the organization, and the claimant's
role in the management of the organization.8 '
The insights derived from the ILM framework lead us to
conclude that in the Sidley type of case, courts should clearly
adopt the "economic realities" or functional test.' The rationale
is twofold. First, in this type of situation where the plaintiff is a
named partner but possesses only relatively minimal authority,
the major concern should be providing the plaintiff with a
mechanism to enforce the ILM agreement. 7 By deciding to adopt
a partnership form of business, and by then adopting an internal
structure much different from the "traditional partnership," as
180. Wells v. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., 271 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 2001)
(discussing the Americans with Disabilities Act), rev'd, 123 S. Ct. 1673 (2003).
181. Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 798 (2d Cir. 1986),
abrogated by Clackamas, 123 S. Ct. 1673.
182. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2000) (applying the Americans with
Disabilities Act to corporations with more than twenty-five employees who work more
than twenty weeks in a calendar year).
183. "[T]he definition of the term employee is not restrictive and must turn on the
facts of a particular case." EEOC v. Pettegrove Truck Serv., Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1430, 1433
(S.D. Fla. 1989).
184. Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Co., P.A., 925 F.2d 1398, 1400-01 (11th Cir. 1991).
185. Strother v. S. Cal. Permanents Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 867 (9th Cir. 1996).
186. See Johnson, supra note 11, at 1095-96 (arguing that properly applied, the
economic realities test improves on the deficiencies associated with the literal test).
187. See EEOC v. Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 2002)
(observing that the employer had a small but powerful executive committee that made
firm-wide decisions).
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described by Justice Powell in Hishon,8s the law firm has de facto
taken away the nonlegal sanctions available to the plaintiffs to
enforce their ILM agreements."8 9 We submit that courts should
address this situation by providing plaintiffs in this type of case
with coverage under the appropriate antidiscrimination statute.
Second, because the dispute arises after the plaintiff has
invested in firm-specific skills, reliance on labels could leave the
plaintiff vulnerable to opportunistic behavior by the employer.19
Courts should make the determination of whether the plaintiff is
covered under the statute by looking at the various factors
identified under the "economies realities" test."' As Judge Posner
suggested in Sidley, this decision might entail thinking of three
possible categories under the ADEA: "partner/employer,"
"partner/employee," and "employee," with protection afforded to
the last two.192
B. Broader Implications
The Sidley case involved a situation where the plaintiffs
were the individuals whose characterization as partners,
employers, or employees was in direct dispute.'98 A different type
of factual scenario has also troubled the courts recently,
including the U.S. Supreme Court.' In this second type of case,
the question is whether the employer meets the minimum
number of employees threshold under the various
antidiscrimination laws.' The question regarding the
classification of an individual as an employee or as a partner
arises because the employer argues that one or more of the
individuals that appears to be an "employee" is in fact a
"partner," and thus should not be counted in deciding whether
188. Refer to notes 44-55 supra and accompanying text (discussing Justice Powell's
view of the traditional partnership).
189. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79-80 (1984) (noting that a
plaintiffs ability to enforce an ILM agreement can be stifled by internal employer
decisions); Sidley, 315 F.2d at 706.
190. Refer to notes 104-08 supra and accompanying text (discussing opportunistic
behavior).
191. Refer to note 183-85 supra and accompanying text.
192. See Sidley, 315 F.3d at 704-07 (explaining that the general applicability of
ADEA's exceptions creates three possible categories of claimants).
193. Id. at 698-99.
194. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 123 S. Ct. 1673, 1676 (2003).
195. Id.; see also Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 794-98 (2d
Cir. 1986) (explaining that plaintiff's status as either a "partner" or a "shareholder" will
be determinative of ADEA applicability), abrogated by Clackamas, 123 S. Ct. 1673; EEOC
v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177, 1178 (2d Cir. 1984) (arguing that determinations of
includable employees rests on plaintiff-shareholder status), abrogated by Clackamas, 123
S. Ct. 1673.
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the employer is covered under the particular antidiscrimination
statute.
9 6
1. Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates v. Wells." 7 In
Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates v. Wells, the plaintiff was
terminated from her job with the defendant, a medical clinic
organized as a professional corporation under state law.9
Plaintiff Wells brought suit alleging unlawful discrimination on
the basis of disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA).'9 The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing
that it was not an "employer" and thus not a "covered entity"
within the meaning of the ADA because it did not have the
requisite "fifteen or more employees for the twenty weeks
required by the statute.""'0 The basis for this argument, according
to the defendant, was that its four physician-shareholders should
not be counted as employees for purposes of determining whether
the defendant was a covered entity.0 ' Relying on the "economic
realities" test, the defendant successfully argued before the
federal district court that its four physician-shareholders should
be regarded as "partners" and not as "employees" within the
meaning of the ADA. 22
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found in
favor of the plaintiff, adopting the literal test to determine
statute coverage.20 ' The court was troubled by the possibility of
permitting professional corporations to secure "'the best of both
possible worlds' by allowing [a professional corporation) both to
assert its corporate status in order to reap the tax and civil
liability advantages and to argue that it is like a partnership in
order to avoid liability for unlawful employment
discrimination.""4 The court emphasized the voluntary nature of
the defendant's decision to form as a professional corporation.2 0
196. Hyland, 794 F.2d at 794-95 (reversing the district court's finding that Hyland
was a partner and therefore could not be included as an employee in the office).
197. 123 S. Ct. 1673.
198. Id. at 1676.
199. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2000).
200. Clackamas, 123 S. Ct. at 1676. "[A]n employer means a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has 25 or more employees for each working day in each
of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year, and any agent of such
person." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(a) (2000).
201. Clackamas, 123 S. Ct. at 1676.
202. Id.
203. Wells v. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., 271 F.3d 903, 905-06 (9th Cir.
2001), reuV'd, 123 S. Ct. 1673 (2003).
204. Id. at 905.
205. Id.
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The court noted that it might be appropriate "to apply an
'economic realities' test to determine that a nominal partner
should... be considered an 'employee' in order to prevent a firm
from labeling the bulk of its employees as partners simply to
insulate itself from liability for discrimination'-the Sidley type
of dispute.06 However, the court noted that the type of dispute
involved in Clackamas was substantively different.0 7 According
to the court, it was inappropriate to apply the "economic
realities" test to the question of whether shareholder-employees
of a corporate enterprise were partners.0 8 The court said that
"[wihile the shareholders of a corporation may or may not be
'employees,' they can never be partners in that corporation
because the roles are 'mutually exclusive. '"'2 9
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, rejecting the
Ninth Circuit's adoption of the literal test. 10 In an opinion
authored by Justice Stevens and joined by six other Justices, the
Court found the literal test ' inconsistent with Congress's decision
to exempt small firms-firms with fewer than twenty-five
employees-from the ADA and with Congress's expectation that
courts would fill in the gaps left as the result of congressional
silence by referring to common law rules on the specific subject
matter.1 '
Having rejected the literal test, the Court adopted the
EEOC's guidelines on the issue of who is an employee and when
partners qualify as employees." ' The EEOC guidelines, which as
the Court noted properly focus on the "touchstone" issue of
control, identify the following six factors:
[1] "Whether the organization can hire or fire the
individual or set the rules and regulations of the
individual's work
[21 "Whether and, if so, to what extent the organization
supervises the individual's work
[3] "Whether the individual reports to someone higher in
the organization
[4] "Whether and, if so, to what extent the individual is
able to influence the organization





210. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 123 S. Ct. 1673, 1680-81 (2003).
211. Id. at 1679.
212. Id. at 1680-81.
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an employee, as expressed in written agreements or
contracts
[61 "Whether the individual shares in the profits, losses,
and liabilities of the organization."213
In adopting the EEOC's approach, the Court noted that
neither individual job titles nor the existence of an "employment
agreement" will be determinative; instead, "'all the incidents of
the relationship'" ought to be considered.2 14 The Court remanded
the case to the Ninth Circuit, noting that while several of the
factors considered under the EEOC guidelines supported the
finding that the four physician-shareholders were not employees
for ADA purposes, contrary evidence existed on the record. 1'
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, dissented,
accusing the majority of unnecessarily shrinking the inquiry as
to who is an employee under the ADA by unduly focusing on the
issue of control in the employment relationship.1 ' Justice
Ginsburg would have found the physician-shareholders to be
employees under the ADA, and thus the defendant to be covered
under the Act." 7 The reasoning of her opinion is, however,
somewhat unclear. At first, it appears that Justice Ginsburg
agrees with the majority's decision to use the common law test.2 18
While criticizing the manner in which the common law functional
test was applied, Justice Ginsburg argues that a broader
application-an application that does not narrowly focus on
control-would have resulted in a different outcome.219
Justice Ginsburg, though, appears to change directions by
arguing that in deciding who is an employee under the ADA-
and arguably in other cases involving antidiscrimination laws-
the courts should look at the corporate form chosen by the
employer.2 In a discussion more consistent with the "literal
test," Justice Ginsburg noted that the effect of selecting to
organize the medical practice as a corporation established a
"separate and distinct" entity in order to reap the advantages of
213. Id. at 1680 (quoting EEOC Compliance Manual § 605:0009 (2000)).
214. Id. at 1680-81 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324
(1992)).
215. Id. at 1681.
216. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 1681-83 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (expressing her determination that the
purpose of the ADA's applicability was to cover employees in offices such as Clackamas).
218. Id. at 1682 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (commenting that the doctors on
Clackamas's premises engaged in daily services as employees).
219. Id. at 1681-82 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 1682 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (positing that shareholders of an
organization who obtain benefits under both federal and state laws as employees should
be prevented from denying their status as employees to prevent ADA applicability).
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limited liability.221 Accordingly, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that
there is "no reason to allow the doctors to escape from their
choice of corporate form when the question becomes whether they
are employees for purposes of federal antidiscrimination
statutes."
In closing, Justice Ginsburg reminded the Court of the real
issue in this case. While the Court had exclusively focused on
whether the physician-shareholders were employees under the
ADA, the plaintiff in this case was not a physician-shareholder,
but a clerical employee, who for every other purpose clearly falls
under the Act's definition of an employee.22 ' Thus, concluded
Justice Ginsburg, "the character of the relationship between [the
employer] and the doctors supplies no justification for
withholding from clerical worker Wells [(the plaintiff)] federal
protection against discrimination in the workplace."
2. Clackamas and Internal Labor Markets. Cases like
Clackamas are significantly different from the Sidley type of case
in several respects. First, unlike in Sidley, the plaintiffs are not
the individuals whose status is under dispute.2 25 The plaintiffs in
this second type of case are clearly employees. 26 The employer is
casting doubts over the status of some other person in the
organization. 7 Second, in these cases, employers have usually
decided to organize themselves as professional corporations in
order to take advantage of various tax laws.28 In professional
corporations, the distinction between owners and employees is
supposed to be very clear.2 The employer, however, argues that
221. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
222. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 1683 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasizing her opinion that clerical
employees should not have their ability to enforce their ILM agreements stripped away by
employer classification).
224. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
225. United States Supreme Court Transcript at 19, Clackamas Gastroenterology
Assocs. v. Wells, 123 S. Ct. 1673 (2003) (No. 01-1435), available at 2003 WL 840129 (Oral
Argument of Irving L. Gornstein for Amicus Curiae United States). In oral argument in
the Clackamas case, the Supreme Court appeared to recognize this distinction. In an
exchange during the oral argument, one of the Justices commented, "Well, I thought we
were looking to see if some other, lower employee was covered, not these directors, and
that turns on whether you count them as employees or not." Id.
226. Clackamas, 123 S. Ct. at 1676 (noting that the dispute centered on whether the
defendants were employees).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1682 (stating that Clackamas shareholders organized their practice as a
professional corporation to limit tax liability).
229. See Wells v. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., 271 F.3d 903, 905, 907 (9th
Cir. 2001) (contending that a decision as to corporate form selection is voluntary and is
calculated to minimize corporate liabilities), rev'd, 123 S. Ct. 1673 (2003).
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some of the alleged professional corporation employees are in fact
shareholder-directors, and thus, should not be counted as
employees regarding the decision as to whether the employer
meets the jurisdictional minimum employee requirement .
We believe that the ILM theory is also relevant in
understanding this second type of case. As in the S&A situation,
the issue of the status of individuals as partners, owners, or
employees relates to the ability of individuals to enforce their
ILM agreements. 1 In choosing an organizational form, the
"employers" or owners have the ability to structure the
employment relationship in a way that facilitates or impedes the
enforcement of these understandings.2  One important
component of that choice is whether an individual will have
access to either internal (nonlegal) or external (legal)
enforcement mechanisms. As discussed above, the partnership
status provides individuals with one such mechanism, and access
to various antidiscrimination statutes provides another.3
When an organization such as a law firm or a medical
practice decides what organizational form to adopt, the
organization is making a choice with implications for the
enforcement of ILM agreements. In the S&A type of case, the
problem from an ILMs perspective is that the employer is
seeking to alter the organizational form midway through the
employment relationship, altering the tradeoffs that individuals
have made earlier. 4 Thus, in that context, it is important for
courts overseeing disputes regarding the actions of the employer
to carefully construe the terms of the original agreement, such as
the definition of being a partner, to prevent employers from
reneging on their original bargain. This attempt to alter the basis
of the ILM's bargain after the initial understanding has been
entered leaves employees vulnerable to opportunistic behavior on
the part of the employer and should be carefully monitored by the
courts. 5 As we argued above, the doctrinal implication of this
230. Clackamas, 123 S. Ct. at 1678.
231. See id. at 1683 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (critiquing the majority's decision by
exposing that determinations of status as partners or shareholders has a major effect on
"employees'" ability to recover under the statute; not only do these decisions impact the owner's
status as a partner, employer, or employee, but individual employees' ability to enforce their
ILM agreement requires a determination that the employer has a certain number of employees
for statute applicability).
232. See Wells, 271 F.3d at 905 (noting that when incorporators of a business adopt a
corporate form, they have the ability to avail themselves of tax and liability advantages).
233. Refer to notes 134-38 supra and accompanying text.
234, Refer to notes 85-99 supra and accompanying text (discussing the employee's
investment in firm-specific skills).
235. See EEOC v. Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 2002)
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argument is that courts should look beyond the labels-avoiding
what Judge Posner calls the "tyranny of labels'-and apply the
functional test when deciding if a particular individual qualifies
as an employee under the various antidiscrimination statutes. 36
Unlike the Sidley type of dispute, in the Clackamas type of
case the decision regarding organizational structure is made
before the beginning of the employment relationship. 237 That is,
the employer decision regarding organizational form precedes the
ILM bargain between the employer and the new hire.2 ' At that
time, both parties make an assessment of the sanctions available
to them to enforce any ILM understanding called for by the
nature of the employment relationship. For example, employees
agreeing to work for a professional corporation employing the
threshold number of employees will know in advance that as
employees they are covered by the various antidiscrimination
laws."9 To the extent that their jobs require potential new hires
to make ILM types of investments, they can assess at that time
whether such a sanction is sufficient to safeguard their
investments, whether they should seek to negotiate other
enforcement mechanisms, or instead seek other job opportunities.
We believe that in order to validate the initial ILM
understanding that the contracting parties appear to be making
in the Clackamas type of situation, courts need to take an
approach different from that suggested above regarding the
Sidley type of case." We argue that courts in this type of case
should adopt a literal or mechanical approach to the issue of
interpreting the definition of the term "employee" under the
various statutes. 4' Thus, if the employer has adopted a
professional corporation form, individuals like the four doctors in
Clackamas will be considered employees, even if those
individuals perform functions similar to those performed by
partners in firms of similar size. Both Justice Ginsburg and the
(questioning the legal ramifications of employees' status when their partnership reconfigures
as a "de facto corporation" and seeks for its partners to be treated as employers under statute).
236. See id. at 699, 702, 705 (reasoning that the "tyranny of labels" problem arises
when legal consequences hinge upon whether one is classified as a partner or an
employee).
237. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 123 S. Ct. 1673, 1676 (2003)
(chronicling the organization of Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates as a professional
corporation and finding the plaintiff as an employed bookkeeper).
238. Id.
239. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2000) (clarifying the definition of
"employer" for the purposes of statute applicability).
240. Refer to note 236 supra and accompanying text.
241. But see Johnson, supra note 11, at 1098 (arguing that the literal test should not
be applied to the Clackamas type of case).
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Ninth Circuit appear to have adopted this argument.242 In
applying the mechanical test in Clackamas, the Ninth Circuit
noted, "Having freely made the choice to adopt this form of
business organization [(a professional corporation), the
defendants] 'should not now be heard' to say that their firm is
'essentially a medical partnership,' and not a corporation."243
Our reasoning is as follows. The decision regarding what
corporate form to adopt is made before a particular dispute
occurs. That decision is then factored by the contracting parties
into their assessment of whether they should invest in firm-
specific skills during the course of their employment relationship.
If potential employees feel that having access to the various
antidiscrimination statutes is important in their decision of
whether to make firm-specific investments with a particular
employer, they might not take a job with a firm formed as a
partnership that does not come under these statutes' coverage. If
on the other hand the new employees decide to make specific
investments knowing that legal sanction will not be available in
case of employer breach, we see little reason why to provide
judicial relief in such situations. In applying the literal or
mechanical test, the courts will be validating the exchange of
information that takes place at the time an individual decides to
seek employment with a particular employer."
We argue that the Supreme Court's application of the
functional test to the Clackamas-type situation is misguided. In
cases like Clackamas, courts should adopt a literal or mechanical
approach to the interpretation of the definition of an "employee"
under the various antidiscrimination statutes. Such an approach
is consistent with the underlying dynamics of ILMs and
necessary to protect employees in their ILM agreements.
V. CONCLUSION
Judge Posner's October 24, 2002 opinion in the Sidley case is
arguably one of the most important in terms of affecting the
nature of the practice of law in many years. Traditionally,
becoming a partner in a firm like S&A was a really big deal.24
242. See Clackamas, 123 S. Ct. at 1682-83 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (reasoning that
Clackamas should be prevented from escaping its selected corporate form in order to
avoid federal antidiscrimination provisions).
243. Wells v. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., 271 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 2001)
(citation omitted), rev'd, 123 S. Ct. 1673 (2003).
244. See Clackamas, 123 S. Ct. at 1682-83 (observing that by restricting Clackamas
Gastroenterology Associates' ability to reconfigure its corporate form, the determination
on whether employees such as Wells can sue under the ADA becomes clearer).
245. Refer to notes 143-47 supra and accompanying text (discussing the incentives of
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Law firm associates toiled arduously for years, making all kinds
of firm-specific investments, in the hope they would reach the
"brass ring" of partnership, and more or less be "tenured" and
"set for life.""4
But, as Bob Dylan has put it, "the times they are a-
changin'."247 S&A recently demoted thirty-two of its older equity
partners to the rank of "counsel" and "senior counsel," and when
these individuals sued the firm for age discrimination, it argued
that employment actions taken against partners in the firm are
not covered by the ADEA."45
In this Article, we disagree with S&A's argument and assert
that an "economic realities" legal test should be applied to the
situation. "Real" partners are able to protect their ILM
investments through the partnership process, but the sad reality
is that the thirty-two demoted equity partners at S&A were not
"real" partners. S&A reneged on its ILM "deal" with these
individuals, and the plaintiffs should be entitled to statutory
redress. We differentiate this situation from that in the
Clackamas case recently decided by the U.S. Supreme Court
where a "literal" or "mechanical" test-as opposed to an
"economic realities" test-for determining employment status
appears more appropriate.
partnership).
246. See generally EEOC v. Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 699, 709
(7th Cir. 2002) (illustrating that each plaintiff had a capital account with the firm, each
was responsible for the liabilities of the firm, and each derived an income based on a
percentage of the overall firm profits).
247. BOB DYLAN, The Times They Are A-Changin', on THE TIMES THEY ARE A-
CHANGIN' (Columbia 1964).
248. Sidley, 315 F.3d at 699, 702.
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